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 Abstract 
We investigate Veblen effects on work hours, namely the way that a desire to emulate the 
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 1. Introduction 
At the close of the 19th century, Thorsten Veblen proposed what he termed 
pecuniary emulation as the foundation of a theory of consumption. Spending, he maintained, 
is driven by relative status considerations, that is by the desire to be a particular type of 
person as much as by the desire to enjoy the consumer goods per se. The Joneses, with whom 
one had to keep up, were not the neighbors but the rich; their level of living became the 
never-attainable objective in a consumption arms race among the less well-to-do.  In The 
Theory of the Leisure Class, he wrote:  
The motive is emulation–the stimulus of an invidious comparison... especially 
in any community in which class distinctions are quite vague, all canons and 
reputability and decency and all standards of consumption are traced back 
by insensible gradations to the usages and thoughts of the highest social and 
pecuniary class, the wealthy leisure class. (p.81).  
While valued by some economists as capturing common-sense aspects of 
consumption as a form of status seeking, Veblen’s view of social preferences was soon 
eclipsed by the simpler and more tractable neoclassical theory of the consumer. Relegated to 
the underworld of economics, Veblen’s ideas have nonetheless resonated over the ensuing 
years in the writing of Duesenberry (1949), Leibenstein (1950), and Galbraith (1958) at the 
middle of the past century and Schor (1998) and Frank (1997) at the century’s close. 
We investigate the importance of Veblen effects in the determination of work hours, 
namely the manner in which a desire to emulate the consumption standards of the rich may 
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influence an individuals’ allocation of time between labour and leisure. Veblen effects are 
derived from a class of social-comparison-based utility functions on which there is a 
growing literature and some empirical evidence.1 Clark and Oswald (1996) for example 
found that the satisfaction levels reported by British workers (in the British Household 
Panel Survey) vary inversely with the wage levels of peers. Neumark and Postlewaite 
(1998), using data from the U.S. NLSY, studied the labour supply decisions of relatives, 
finding some evidence that women whose sister’s husband had a higher income than their 
own husband were more likely to be employed.  
                                                          
1
   See   Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Layard (1980), Frey and Stutzer (2002),  van 
Praag (1993),  Sen (1983), Hirsch (1976), Scitovsky (1976), and Easterlin (1974). Frank 
(1997), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995).  Clark and Oswald (1996) provide extensive 
additional references to the empirical literature.  By comparison to the economic literature, 
the relevant sociological and social psychological literature is extensive and venerable: 
Homans (1961) and Festinger (1957) are influential contributions.   
These studies provide some support for comparison based utility functions, but do 
not test Veblen effects directly.  An explicitly Veblen-inspired study by Schor (1998) using 
a U.S. sample asked respondents how their “financial status” compared to that of those in 
their reference group (primarily co-workers and friends).  While a majority of her sample 
responded that they personally did not feel pressure to “keep up with the Joneses,” Schor 
found that, independently of the effects of annual and permanent income and other standard 
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regressors, those whose financial status was below their reference group saved significantly 
less than those who were better off than their reference group. Interestingly, those who 
watched TV more saved less, conditional on the other regressors. 
Our model of the choice of work hours, presented in the next section, captures 
Veblen effects by taking account of the influence of the consumption of the well-to-do on 
the marginal utility of own consumption of the less-well-off. The main result is that work 
hours are increasing in the degree of income inequality.  We then use data on average annual 
work hours in ten countries over the period 1963-1998, along with data on inequality of 
income to explore this hypothesis. Inequality is a predictor of work hours in both OLS and 
fixed-effects estimates; its effects are large, and estimates are robust across a variety of 
specifications.  This result is consistent with the hypothesis that social comparisons are 
upwards to a richer reference group and is inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis that 
social comparisons are downward looking, people’s consumption and work choices 
reflecting a desire to distance themselves from a poorer reference group. We then address an 
alternative interpretation in which a positive relationship between work hours and 
inequality is due to the incentive effects of the latter (Bell and Freeman, 2001). In the 
penultimate section we consider some of the normative implications of Veblen effects, 
identifying a class of policies which can implement a social welfare optimum: included are 
subsidies for the leisure of the rich and a graduated consumption tax (but not a flat 
consumption tax).2  
                                                          
2
 Corneo and Olivier (1997) analyze optimal taxation in Veblen-inspired model of an 
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 2. Veblen Effects on Work Hours 
Veblen held that consumption is motivated by a desire for social standing as well as 
for the enjoyment of the goods and services per se (page numbers are from Veblen (1934) 
the proximate ground for expenditure in excess of what is required for 
physical comfort is ...a desire to live up to the conventional standard of 
decency...(p.81)  
His key idea (quoted at the outset) was that the best-off members of a community -- “the 
leisure class” -- establish the standards for the rest. 
But why is it the consumption of the leisure class that is emulated rather than their leisure? 
Veblen’s response was that under modern conditions consumption is a more visible form of 
display. 
The exigencies of the modern industrial system frequently place individuals 
and households in juxtaposition between whom there is little contact in any 
other sense than juxtaposition. One's neighbors, mechanically speaking, 
often are socially not one’s neighbors, or even acquaintances; and still their 
transient good opinion has a high degree of utility. The only practicable 
means of impressing one’s pecuniary ability on these unsympathetic 
observers of one’s everyday life is an unremitting demonstration of the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
indivisible conspicuous consumption good with both snobbish and conformist consumers. 
As in the model below, the tax implications of the Veblen effects they model depend on the 
number of consumers.  
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ability to pay.  (p.71) 
Veblen’s ideas are thus a precursor to the contemporary theory of costly signaling of 
otherwise unobservable qualities initiated in economics by Spence (1973) and in biology by 
Zahavi (1975).3  
The following model embodies the two propositions underlying Veblen’s account, 
namely that people compare consumption (or wealth) but not leisure, and that they refer 
upwards, choosing their work and spending activities in order to be more like a higher 
income group, rather than seeking social distance from lower income groups.  Suppose 
individuals differ in some trait that influences hourly wages and that they choose their hours 
of work (h) to maximize a utility function, the arguments of which are leisure (which we 
normalize as 1-h) and what we term effective consumption, c* defined as their own 
consumption level (c) minus a constant v (for Veblen) times the consumption level of some 
higher income reference group (c~). The individual’s reference group might be the very rich, 
or it might be an intermediate group. The reference group’s rank in the income distribution 
is taken as exogenous, as is the Veblen constant v.  It may be convenient to think of each 
individual as belonging to a homogeneous income class, each member of which takes the 
next highest income class as its reference group (the richest class have no reference group). 
Together, the reference group and v measure the nature and intensity of the relevant social 
comparisons. Individuals do not save, so c = wh, where w is the wage rate.  Thus for some 
individual not in the richest group we have 
                                                          
3
 See the works cited in Gintis, Smith, and Bowles (2002). 
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                               u = u(c*, h) 
                             u = u((wh-vc~), h)                                                                       (1) 
where u is increasing and concave in its first argument and decreasing and convex in the 
second. Leisure and consumption are complements so uc*h < 0.  The effect of increased 
consumption by members of the reference group thus is both to lower the utility of the 
individual and to raise the marginal utility of effective consumption. The individual will 
choose hours to be h*, namely that which equates the marginal rate of substitution between 
leisure and effective consumption to the wage rate.4 
We can now consider the effects of an exogenous increase in the wages of the richest 
group (raising c~ relative to wh for every income class except the richest). Differentiating 
the individual's first order condition for the choice of work hours (and using the second 
order condition) we find that dh*/dc~ has the sign of -(uc*c* +uc*h), which is positive. The 
effect of the larger gap between the consumption levels of the individual and the reference 
group is to reduce effective consumption wh-vc~, and thus raise the marginal utility of 
consumption relative to the marginal utility of leisure, inducing an increase in the hours of 
work. The effect on work hours of variations in the Veblen constant have the same sign ( 
dh*/dv >0), reflecting an increase in the intensity of social comparison and perhaps 
                                                          
4
 If the utility function is Cobb-Douglas in leisure and effective consumption (with 
a the coefficient of c* and 1-a the coefficient of (1-h)) then the choice of hours is such that 
 
h*/(1-h*) = a/(1-a) + vc~/w(1-h) 
 
with the increased hours indicated by the second term on the right hand side representing the 
Veblen effect (if v = 0,  h = a).  
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capturing the negative effect of TV watching on saving in Schor’s study.   
If, contra Veblen, the reference group were the poor (others seeking to distance 
themselves from the reference group), then an increase in inequality associated with a 
decline in the wages of the poorest group would induce a reduction in work hours of other 
higher income groups. Thus are able to empirically test whether the comparisons are 
upwards, to a rich reference group as in the Veblen hypothesis, or downwards to a poorer 
group from which others are seeking social distance. 
For individuals less well off than the reference group, a simple labour supply 
function may be derived that is additive in its conventional and Veblen effects. To see this, 
normalize the wage of the less well-off to unity and suppose that all (the rich and the not-so- 
rich) share the following utility function (an example of (1) above).  
                                              u = lnc* - 
 
h                                                                  (2)
 In the absence of Veblen effects (v = 0, so c* = wh) each utility maximizing individual  
would select h so as to equate the disutility of labour (  ) to the marginal benefit of labour via 
its contribution to consumption (1/h), thus setting  h=1/  .  With v > 0 the work hours of the 
rich are unaffected, but those not in the reference group (with superscript n) will now set 
their work hours at  
                                                hn = 1/
 
 + vwrhr                                                             (3) 
where the superscript r refers to the rich reference group. As can be seen from (3) those not 
in the reference group work more hours, as we would expect, the second additional term 
representing the Veblen effect.  An extension of this model with many income groups each 
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of which (except the richest) takes the next richest group as its reference group (footnotes  
8 and 10, below) shows than a increase in consumption by the rich generates a downward 
cascade of Veblen effects, increasing work hours throughout the income distribution. 
One aspect of the model deserves comment, namely the assumption that individuals 
choose their hours of work. In a collective bargaining framework or an efficiency wage 
model, employers play a major role in setting work hours, and the relationship between 
individual preferences and observed hours may be considerably attenuated. Not 
surprisingly, a significant fraction of employees in the advanced economies would prefer 
hours different from what they have (Bell and Freeman, 2001). However in the studies 
reported, a majority preferred current pay with current hours (rather than more hours and 
more pay, or less hours and less pay) and Bell and Freeman report evidence that most 
European Community workers would prefer increases in pay (at the current hours) to 
decreases in hours (at the current total earnings) suggesting that they are close to the hours 
they would have chosen, even if the institutional setting allows no direct relationship 
between individual hours choices and outcomes. Böheim and Taylor (2004) report similar 
results using the British Household Panel Survey.   
This evidence that work hours respond to employee preferences may reflect the fact 
that employers and unions alike have an interest in taking account of employee preferences 
concerning hours of work (to maximize job rents and improve labour discipline, for 
example), even if this interest competes with tax and benefits arrangements which 
sometimes produce significant differences between actual and desired hours. As a result, 
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individual preferences will affect observed work hours even in environments in which 
employees do not literally choose their work hours. 
A second comment on the model concerns its behavioral foundations. We do not 
suppose that people engage in a conscious optimizing process in selecting their work hours. 
A more plausible view is that individuals have norms concerning the appropriate division 
of their time between family, friends, work, and other activities, and that these norms differ 
from group to group and evolve over time. Suppose this is the case, and that people simply 
seek to implement their “work hour norm”, occasionally updating this norm in response to 
two kinds of information: their perceptions of the subjective well-being others and the hours 
of work of others.  A plausible model of this learning process would combine payoff-based 
updating with conformism: that is, individuals adopt the norms of those in their social group 
perceived to be happier, but with a conformist bias towards adopting norms held by large 
numbers of their associates, independently of the associated utility levels (Bowles (2004)). 
Then the model just presented gives the payoff -based aspect of the updating of the work 
hour norm. The main result is that the work hour norm typical of a given group (other than 
the richest) is increasing in the level of inequality but that the short run Veblen effect might 
be attenuated by conformist effects.  
 3. Work Hours and Inequality 
The importance of both social norms and labour market institutions in the 
determination of work hours suggests that it may be illuminating to study work hours 
averaged over individuals. We use data on average annual hours of work for ten advanced 
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economies. The annual data for the ten countries presented in Figure 1 indicate substantial 
and growing differences between economies. The work year in Germany exceeded that in 
the U.S. by 231 hours in 1960, and had fallen to 365 hours less than the U.S. by 1998. Many 
countries show a decline in hours prior to the early 1980s followed by a leveling off or 
increase (in Sweden the work year fell by 388 hours over the first two decades and then 
increased by 128 hours over the next two decades) 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Because the reference group for Veblen effects is the rich, we chose a measure of 
income inequality that is sensitive to upper incomes, namely the ratio of the highest earnings 
in 90th percentile  (that dividing the 90th from the 91st percentile) to the highest earnings in 
the 50th percentile. We also present estimates using two alternative measures of inequality, 
the Gini coefficient of after-tax incomes from the Luxemburg Income Study and a Theil 
index of inter-industry wage differences. Figure 2 presents the percentile data along with the 
annual hours, as well as the country means for these variables. The simple correlation   ( r 
= 0.66) is substantial, but as we will see, it arises in part from covarying influences on hours 
and inequality.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
We therefore estimate a more complete model.  
                    hit = a + bgit + cxit +   i  + 
  t
 +  it                                                              (4)  
where hit is the natural logarithm of work hours in country i in time t, g is the measure of 
inequality, xit is a vector of other possible exogenous influences on hours (with c its vector 
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of estimated coefficients),    i is a country fixed effect,   t is a year fixed effect, and  it is an 
error term. The country fixed effects will take account of cultural and institutional 
differences and other country-specific unobserved influences on hours. Among the 
x-variables we considered union density (to capture possible time-varying institutional 
differences), real gross domestic product per capita (to measure possible influences of 
income levels on consumption and leisure preferences) and real manufacturing wages (to 
capture conventional  labour supply effects). The latter two were expressed in common 
units using purchasing power parity conversions.  Because hours vary cyclically in response 
to labour demand rather than to individual labour supply decisions, we also include a 
measure of aggregate unemployment. To account for changes in the gender composition of 
the workforce we include the women as a fraction of employment. We included year fixed 
effects to capture the possible influences of changes in preferences (or other determinants 
of work hours) possibly reflecting the diffusion of what Inglehart (1977) terms “post 
materialist values.” However, extensive experimentation with the available measures of 
“post materialist values” did not reveal any systematic results. Finally, we used measure of 
government expenditures relative to gross domestic product. The variable proved 
insignificant while having no appreciable effect on the results reported below. 
We treat g as exogenous. A more adequate approach would take g and h to be jointly 
determined.5  A plausible exogenous instrument for g proved impossible to find. Thus our 
                                                          
5
  We have (in reduced forms):  g = g(h; z) and h = h(g;k) where z and k are exogenous 
influences. We would like to estimate the partial effect on h of an exogenous shift in g that 
is hg. What we observe, however, are intersections of these two functions, inferences from 
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results could capture the effect of exogenous shifts in labour supply on the degree of 
inequality.  To test this possibility we use both contemporaneous and one year lagged 
inequality measures on the right hand side of (4). The results with lagged inequality 
measures (presented in Table 2) are virtually identical to those with contemporaneous 
regressions. Our view that the endogeneity problem is not accounting for our results is 
supported by a companion study (Park, 2004) of the U.S. in which the labor force 
participation of wives of full time full year working men covaries with measures of income 
inequality among men of similar age and of the same locality. Because it is unlikely that the 
labour force decisions of wives affected  income inequality among men (especially during 
the period studied,  1969-1979)  it  appears inequality was the  cause of increased work 
hours rather than the converse.   
                                                                                                                                                                              
which (unless gh = 0) will over- or underestimate the true effect. If g varies inversely with h 
-- increases in work hours of those in the middle of the earnings distribution attenuating 
inequality -- we underestimate the true effect, and conversely.  
Our estimates appear in Table 1. Our preferred estimate (I) as well as alternative 
estimates using other measures of inequality (II) and (III) indicate significant positive 
effects of inequality on work hours. Moreover, these effects are large. A standard deviation 
change in 90/50 percentile ratio, Gini, and Theil, is associated with a predicted increase in 
annual hours of 3.4, 2.2 and 1.8 percent respectively.  Taken literally this means that the 
difference in the U.S. and Swedish percentile ratio in 1992 accounts for 59 percent of the 
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difference between the hours of work in the two countries. 
The estimates also suggest a small (and in the preferred estimate, not significant) 
negative labour supply elasticity consistent with other estimates of labour supply functions 
and with the derived labour supply function above (3). The unemployment rate has the 
predicted coefficient, as does the female proportion in employment.  In OLS estimates (not 
shown) Union Density had a large and statistically significant negative coefficient; but in 
these country fixed-effects equations its coefficient is small and positive, suggesting that 
our country fixed effects may be capturing some of the institutional differences associated 
with the degree of unionization. The specific country effects across all of the equations 
indicate major differences among the countries due to idiosyncratic effects of time invariant 
cultural, institutional and other country differences uncorrelated with the regressors.  
Sweden and Norway are similar in their short work year while the English-speaking 
countries are distinct and not significantly different from one another in their long work 
hours; the remainder of the continental countries occupy a middle ground with Belgium 
closest to the Nordic pattern.  The country-effect difference between the English speaking 
and the Nordic group is about 295 hours per year, indicating large idiosyncratic effects 
presumably due to cultural, political, and other differences.  
We estimated the same fixed-effects equations as in Table 1, but using as our 
dependent variable the natural logarithm of the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics series on 
average annual hours of manufacturing workers. This series may provide a more accurate 
measure of hours (but for a more limited portion of the population.) The results in Table 2, 
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which cover the same countries and time period, show that the coefficients of our three 
inequality measures are highly significant, and of approximately the same magnitudes as 
those using the OECD labour hours series. Table 2 also presents the estimated coefficients 
of one year lagged inequality measures. The results with lagged inequality measures are 
very similar to or slightly stronger than those with contemporaneous regressions, suggesting 
that our results are not driven by the endogenous relation between work hours and 
inequality. Lastly, we show the coefficients of inequality measures for a specification 
without the country fixed effects (but with the year fixed effects). As expected, the estimates 
of the Veblen effect are considerably larger, but these are likely to be upward biased because 
of the co-variation of both hours and inequality with time-invariant country-specific 
differences, the effects of which are captured in our fixed-effects estimates.  
4. Other Explanations
The fact that inequality predicts work hours is consistent with the Veblen effects 
proposed at the outset, but there are other consistent explanations. Bell and Freeman (2001) 
have suggested that inequality induces longer work hours because those who work longer 
hours attain a higher percentile rank in the wage distribution at the workplace and an 
increase in rank implies greater wage gains the more unequal is the wage distribution.  They 
provide convincing evidence for this effect: In the U.S. and Germany wage inequality 
within detailed occupation/industry cells is positively correlated with work hours for those 
working more thirty-five hours per week and longer.  
Discriminating empirically between this incentive-based account and the social 
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comparisons interpretation offered here may be impossible, and it is very likely that both 
incentive and Veblen effects are at work. However, we are not persuaded that the Bell and 
Freeman model accounts for the relationship apparent in Figure 2 and Table 1. First, Bell 
and Freeman treat long hours as an effective signal of a difficult to observe quality likely to 
result in promotion. While this is true for young lawyers as in the account by Landers, 
Rebitzer, and Taylor (1996), we think it more likely that hard work when on the job (that is, 
effort, not hours) is a more common way to move up. Second, the fact that their 
inequality-hours relationship is much weaker (in both the U.S. and Germany) for all 
workers (rather than just those working full time or more) is not easy to reconcile with their 
model. Finally Bell (1998) found that black workers in the U.S. in 1990 are more responsive 
to measures of earnings inequality among blacks only. Bell suggests that this may be 
because the black-only distribution is a better indicator of the gains to working longer hours 
(but points out that it is not easy to explain why this would be so). A more parsimonious 
explanation might be that the relevant reference group for black workers is other black 
workers, and their response to measures of black-only inequality is picking up a Veblen 
effect.  
These caveats about the Bell-Freeman interpretation are far from decisive, however. 
 It would be valuable to see if the evidence for Veblen effects is robust when using a 
measure of inequality that could not plausibly be related to the incentive effects they stress. 
Two measures accomplish this. First, the previously-mentioned study (Park, 2004) showing 
that wives' labour force participation covaries with male income inequality cannot plausibly 
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be capturing the incentive effects, unless we have a reason to believe that having a wife with 
a job has positive implication on a husband’s promotion.  
Second, the most plausible measure of inequality for the incentive effects view 
would be within firm or within industry inequality, of the type Bell and Freeman used. The 
reason is that if workers are putting in extra hours to impress their employer, it is the firm's 
wage structure that is providing the incentive, not the level of inequality within other firms, 
and less still, the difference in average wages between firms. (Employers in other firms have 
no way of knowing how many hours a worker puts in.)  Thus the Theil index of 
inter-industry average wage inequality provides such a test.  The fact that this measure of 
inequality is a significant predictor of work hours (equation III in Table 1) suggests that the 
Veblen effects model captures some of the causal mechanisms at work, for this measure 
could not possibly be capturing the Bell-Freeman incentive effects.  Notice (equation IV) 
that the estimate of its coefficient is reduced only marginally by the addition of the 
percentile ratio to the equation, suggesting that the estimated effect on work hours in 
equation III is not primarily due to the correlation of the Theil index with other measures of 
inequality that may be picking up incentive effects modeled by Bell and Freeman.  
A second alternative interpretation of the inequality-hours relationship is that the 
acceleration of skill-intensive technical change over the last two decades may have 
increased inequality and at the same time increased hours of work. Freeman (2002) for 
example, found that in the U.S. those using computers or the Internet at work put in longer 
hours, and we know from Krueger (1993) that computer use has raised the economic returns 
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to schooling. Taken together, these two facts suggest that an exogenous increase in 
computer use may account for a positive correlation between hours and earnings inequality. 
 We do not think this accounts for our results, however, because when we split our time 
period (at 1983) using the Theil index (the only measure on which we have sufficiently long 
time series to do this) we find that its estimated coefficient in the early period is almost 
twice that in the later period.6 
 5. Consumption inequality as a public bad 
If Veblen effects of the type modeled here are important, there may be a case for 
public policies to limit consumption on the conventional grounds that it generates social 
costs not accounted in the private calculations of the consumer.  Frank (1997) and others 
have proposed a tax exemption for savings on just this grounds.7 Veblen effects are an 
example of this class of consumption externalities, but with two special characteristics.  
First, note that the usual consumption externalities are symmetrical (my 
consumption reduces the well being of the Jones’ I am trying to keep up with, just as theirs 
reduces mine). But Veblen effects are asymmetrical: if the Jones’ are richer than me, they 
do not care about my consumption but instead are trying to keep up with some even richer 
reference group. Thus Veblen effects cascade downward through the income distribution, 
                                                          
6
 Both estimates are smaller than the estimate in Table 1 and are only marginally 
significant, suggesting that inequality may explain much of the distinct nature of the two 
periods evident in Figure 1, while providing a weaker account of the within-period 
movements.  
7
 Among others, Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Ireland (1994) and Oswald (1983) 
have made similar proposals. 
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with the richest group inflicting subjective costs on the next group, whose emulation of the 
consumption of the rich then augments its own consumption level, thus passing additional 
subjective costs to the groups further down.  
A second difference is that the influence of a reference group in the Veblen-inspired 
model may be substantially independent of its size, so a relatively small number of well-off 
but visible consumers may constitute the reference consumption standard for a much larger 
number of less well-off individuals. In this case their consumption decisions may inflict 
subjective costs on large numbers of less well-off individuals. For both reasons -- the 
asymmetry of the effects and the differing sizes of various ranks in the income distribution 
-- an appropriate policy response to Veblen effects may be a progressive consumption tax 
rather than the flat consumption tax implied by symmetrical consumption externalities.  
To see why this is true take a simple two-class society in which there are a number 
(normalized to unity) of well-off individuals indicated (as above) by the superscript r, and 
a larger number, n, of less well-off people. As our point is to clarify the logic of policies to 
correct Veblen-effects rather than to advocate particular policies, we will retain our 
simplifying assumptions (including that there is no saving). We also set the wage of the less 
well-off at unity. Using the utility function (2) and the resulting labour supply function (3), 
suppose that a social planner wished to know what level of work hours of both groups 
would maximize the sum of utilities in this society,   , where  
                         = ln(hrwr) -   hr + n[ln(hn  - vwrhr) -   hn ].                                        (5) 
The planner would know that in the social optimum the consumption of the well-off will be 
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less than under private optimization, and because there are no savings, the only way to 
accomplish this is to reduce the work hours of the well-off. As the work hours of the lower 
group generate no externalities (they are the reference group for no one) the planner would 
simply vary hr to maximize   , using (3) to take account of the endogenous response of hn to 
the planner’s chosen level of hr.  While private optimization induces the rich to equate the 
marginal contribution of work to (private) consumption utility (1⁄ hr ) to the (private) 
disutility of labour (  ), social welfare optimization requires 
                                             1/ hr* = 
 
 +  
 
nvw
r
                                                           (6) 
where the first term on the right is the private cost (disutility of labour) experienced by the 
rich and the second is  the sum of the marginal social cost imposed on those attempting to 
emulate the well-to-do.  The aggregate-welfare maximizing level of work hours of the rich 
is thus given by 
                                            hr* = 1
  (1 + nvwr )                                                          (7) 
which shows that the welfare optimum requires the rich to work less than 1/
 
 by  a 
proportional amount nvwr which  is equal to the sum of the loss in effective consumption 
imposed on the lower income group. The required change in the work hours of the rich is 
proportional to both the relative size of the two income groups and to their wage rates.8   As 
                                                          
8
  Were there m members of a third (poorer) class for whom the next highest income 
class is the reference group, with a wage rate wo and hours of work ho, a tedious calculation 
shows that 
 
hr* = 1
  (1 + vwr (n + mv/wo))  
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the social optimum requires a change in the labour-leisure allocations of the higher-income 
reference group but not of the lower income group, the social planner will not introduce an 
across the board consumption tax (applying to both groups). A well designed policy will 
target the consumption of the rich specifically, as it is this which generates the negative 
externalities. 
From (6) we see that the implied reduction in the work hours of the rich could be 
implemented by policies that enhance their marginal utility of leisure (or what is equivalent, 
increasing their marginal disutility of labour) by a proportional amount   nvwr.9   Suppose 
the social planner’s only instrument is a linear tax on the consumption of the well-off. The 
particular utility function used here implies that the tax will not affect the labour hours they 
perform, so a tax at rate    will reduce the consumption of the reference group by the same 
rate.  Assuming that the tax revenues, when spent, yield a per dollar contribution to 
aggregate welfare of 

, the planner will vary    to maximize:  
                = ln(hrwr(1- ))-   hr +n[ln(hm  - vwrhr (1- ))-  hn ] +    wrhr                        (8) 
The resulting optimal tax rate   * is given  (using (3) and hr = 1/  ) by  
                                                                                                                                                                              
A comparison with (7) shows that the optimal work hours of the rich are further reduced by 
the consideration of additional poorer classes.  
9
  This could be accomplished, for example by subsidizing the leisure activities of the 
rich. Under these conditions the rich would maximize 
 
u
r 
=  ln(hrwr)-  h(1+nvwr) 
 
and their private optimization would give the first order condition (6) thus  implementing 
(7).  
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                                       nvw
r
 + 

w
rhr = 1/(1-  *),                                                         (9) 
This requires that the tax rate be selected to equate the marginal benefits of additional taxes 
(that is the reduced Veblen effects for the less well-off plus the expenditure benefits,  shown 
on the left-hand side of (9)) to the marginal costs (in reduced consumption) to the well-off 
(the right-hand side).      
Setting 

=0 so as to abstract from the expenditure related benefits of the tax policy), 
and assuming that nvwr  < 1, 
                                               * = 1- 1/nvwr                                                             (10) 
As expected, the optimal tax is increasing in the relative size of the less well-off group, the 
size of the Veblen effect, and the relative wages of the better-off group.10  
 6. Conclusion 
We have shown that increased inequality induces people to work longer hours and 
have also provided evidence that the underlying cause is the Veblen effect of the 
consumption the rich on the behavior of those less well off.  The effects are large enough to 
invite attention from policy makers.  
The design of policies to attenuate possible market failures arising from Veblen 
                                                          
10
 If there exists a third, poorer class, as defined in the previous footnote, and the 
intermediate class is taxed at the rate   m < 1, the optimal tax on the consumption of the rich 
increases to 
 
                            * = 1- [nvwr(1+mv(1-   m)/nwo ]-1                                                       (10') 
 
to take account of the indirect Veblen effects (via increased work and consumption by the 
middle group) on the well-being of the poorest group (the increase in   * varying positively 
with the relative size of the poorer class and inversely with its wage.)  
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effects requires attention to considerations wholly absent above, including their effects on 
savings, distributional impacts and political viability (the public might not favor subsidizing 
wilderness retreats for the well-off, even if, as the leisure subsidy example requires, they 
were inconspicuous!) We will not address these issues here.  It is clear, however, that 
policies designed to discourage consumption per se (such as the flat consumption tax 
advocated by many) are not optimally designed to address Veblen effects. The reason is that 
where Veblen effects are important, the social cost imposed by consumption depends on 
who is doing it, on the structure of reference groups (who cares about whom) and the size 
of the hierarchically ordered reference groups. The consumption of those who, like the 
well-to-do, are directly or indirectly reference models for many would ideally be taxed at a 
higher rate than the consumption of those who are models to none or to few.11 Such a policy 
would be doubly attractive as it as it would enhance the welfare of the less well-off by 
limiting the downward cascade of welfare-reducing Veblen effects while funding valued 
social projects or allowing the reduction of other incentive-distorting forms of taxation. As 
(10) shows, the richer and smaller is the reference group, the higher is the tax rate that 
maximizes total social utility.  
For well known reasons, policies that raise average living standards while favoring 
the less well off should be attractive to vote-maximizing political parties and candidates. 
Specific taxes on high-end consumption items have occasionally been advocated, and the 
                                                          
11
 A government that sought to increase output (rather than maximizing the sum of 
utilities) could mobilize Veblen effects by shifting the tax burden from the rich to the less 
well-off, thereby inducing higher levels of work hours among the latter.  
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village of Mamaroneck, New York even placed a limit on house size specifically to curb 
Veblen effects (Foderano, 2001).  But Veblen-inspired policies are a rarity in both academic 
and policy circles.12  Trends in work hours have responded to other influences.  
Over a century ago Veblen thought that conspicuous consumption would increase in 
importance. 
The means of communication and the mobility of the population now expose 
the individual to the observation of many persons who have no other means 
of judging his reputability than the display of goods... the present trend of 
                                                          
12
 This may be due to their seemingly punitive stance towards the welloff. It is easy 
to see, however, that one could design a Pareto-improving policy to attenuate negative 
consumption spillovers. Let the rich have a utility function that values some form of 
“inconspicuous consumption” that does not stimulate emulation, in addition to both 
conspicuous consumption and leisure. Suppose that instead of a tax on the consumption of 
the rich, a restriction on their work hours was introduced. Because in the pre-restriction 
allocation they selected their work hours to maximize their utility (choosing hr so that dur/dhr 
 = 0), a sufficiently small reduction in their work hours would have only second-order effects 
on their utility while conferring a cascade of first-order benefits on those below them in the 
social comparison ranking.  Thus there exists some Pareto improving hours restriction on the 
rich, accompanied by a transfer of income to the rich from the rest, with the proviso that it 
must be spent on inconspicuous consumption. 
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the development is in the direction of heightening the utility of conspicuous 
consumption as compared with leisure. (pp. 71-72) 
The description seems almost contemporary, and could well apply now across nations, as 
large cosmopolitan elements in many populations now take their consumption standards 
from the well to do in New York, Milano or Tokyo rather than their domestic exemplars of 
style and respectability. 
But since he wrote, leisure has not been crowded out by consumption, conspicuous 
or otherwise.  Indeed in the nations on which data are available, since 1870 work hours have 
declined substantially, by roughly fifty percent in continental Europe and by about a third in 
the English-speaking nations (Huberman, 2004a,b). It seems plausible, and consistent with 
our estimates for a much shorter period, that among the causes included the sustained 
increase in per capita income, the increase in women’s labour force participation, and the 
very long term decline in the income share of the top income earners, in many countries 
extending from the early part of the 20th century until well into its final quarter.13 
                                                          
13
 See the Dell (2003) on Germany and the data on France, UK and the U.S. presented 
in Piketty and Saez (2003) 
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Table 1. Estimates of the relationship between work hours and inequality 
 I II III IV 
     
Constant 9.635 7.833 10.279 9.878 
 (16.95) (12.16) (30.18) (16.27) 
Percentile Earnings Ratio 0.177   0.126 
 (4.81)   (2.95) 
GINI Coefficient (After-tax Income)  0.030   
  (2.22)   
Inter-Industry Earnings Inequality   0.023 0.020 
   (5.74) (2.81) 
Ln(Real Wage) -0.021 -0.041 -0.055 -0.017 
  (-0.69) (-2.56) (-7.47) (-0.51) 
Ln(Real GDP per capita) -0.234 -0.065 -0.256 -0.243 
  (-3.70) (-0.98) (-7.30) (-3.57) 
Union Density 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.018 
  (3.60) (0.30) (0.64) (2.65) 
Unemployment Rate -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 
  (-5.17) (-5.67) (-6.25) (-4.34) 
Female Proportion in Employment  -0.094 0.038 -0.070 -0.106 
 (-3.82) (1.17) (-4.35) (-4.18) 
Country and Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 155 89 240 143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.958 0.979 0.967 0.961 
Note: The dependent variable is Ln(Average annual work hours). The number of observations is limited by the 
fact that our inequality measures are not available for all years. 
 
Table 2. Alternative estimates of the Veblen effect 
 P90/50 GINI THEIL 
Using BLS (Manufacturing) Hours  0.090 0.042 0.033 
 (2.47) (2.66) (7.60) 
Using One-year Lagged Inequality  0.170 0.049 0.027 
 (4.45) (3.50) (5.90) 
Without Country Fixed Effect  0.528 1.015 0.066 
 (9.30) (7.20) (11.36) 
Note: The dependent variable is Ln(Average annual work hours).  
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Figure 1.  Work hours over time 
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Source: OECD Labor Market Statistics Data Set 
(http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthenticate.asp) 
*
 Average annual hours of work are the number of hours worked on average by persons for total employment 
(average employment over the year) Refer Data Appendix for detailed definition. 
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Figure 2. Earnings inequality and average annual work hours 
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Source: OECD Labor Market Statistics Data Set 
(http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthenticate.asp)  
*
 Earnings Inequality (percentile ratio) is based on gross earnings of full-time workers and is the ratio of 
earnings at 90th percentile to the median earnings (as described in the text). Refer Data Appendix for detailed 
definition. 
**
 Square blocks represent country average of each country and diamond shaped points are annual data. 
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